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Abstract. Gaunilo argued that Anselm could prove the existence of many perfect 
objects, for example, the happiest island, that is, happier than any other island. 
more formally, Gaunilo’s arguments were intended to show that the sentence 
“God exists” does not follow from premises accepted by Anselm. Contemporary 
versions of the ontological proof use the maximalization procedure in order to 
demonstrate that God exists as the most perfect being. This paper argues that 
this method, which is based on maximalization, is not sufficient to prove God’s 
existence. Thus, a “contemporary Gaunilo” can repeat objections raised by his 
ancestor.
Gaunilo, a benedictine monk (who lived in the years 1033–1011, mostly 
in the marmoutier Abbey in France), offered the first criticism of st. 
Anselm’s ontological proof of God’s existence in a small booklet Liber pro 
insipiente (on behalf of the Fool). The title alludes to the words “How the 
Fool said in his heart which cannot be said” at the beginning of Chapter 
IV of Anselm’s Proslogion (written in 1077–1078).1 Although this phrase 
is a rather pejorative piece of rhetoric, Gaunilo took it as innocent and 
formulated arguments defending the Fool. The text of Liber pro insipiente 
was added to Proslogion together with Anselm’s reply.2 my aim in this 
1 I  quote the Proslogion from Anselm of Canterbury’s, Complete Philosophical and 
Theological Treatises, tr. by J. Hopkins and H. richardson (minneapolis: The Arthur 
J. benning Press, 2000), pp. 88–112.
2 I quote the texts that constitute these polemics from the ‘Internet History sourcebooks 
Project’, tr. by s. Deane, ed. by P. Halsall, http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/
gaunilo.htm [accessed 11th June 2012].
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paper is to evaluate the Gaunilo/Anselm exchange from a contemporary 
(logical) perspective. roughly speaking, I will play the role of a “modern 
Gaunilo”. since Gaunilo did not refer to Monologion, Anselm’s earlier 
work, I  will not mention this work either. In fact, since Proslogion 
continues and improves upon Monologion, restricting my discussion to 
the former is justified from a systematic point of view also.
The relevant text from Anselm’s Proslogion runs as follows (excerpts 
from pp. 93–95):
CHAPTer TWo
God truly [i. e. really] exists. [...].
Indeed, we believe You to be something than which nothing greater can be 
thought. or is there, then, no such nature [as You], for the Fool has said in his 
heart that God does not exist? but surely when this very same Fool hears my 
words “something than which nothing greater can be thought”, he understands 
what he hears. And what he understands is in his understanding, even if he does 
not understand [i.e. judge] it to exist. For that a thing is in the understanding 
is distinct from understanding that [this] thing exists. [...] so even the Fool is 
convinced that something than which nothing greater can be thought is at least 
in his understanding; for when he hears of this [being], he understands [what 
he hears], and whatever is understood is in the understanding. but surely that 
than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be only in the understanding. 
For if it were only in the understanding, it could be thought to exist also in 
reality – something which is greater [than existing only in the understanding]. 
Therefore, if that than which a  greater cannot be thought were only in the 
understanding, then that than which a greater cannot be thought would be that 
than which a greater can be thought! but surely this [conclusion] is impossible. 
Hence, without doubt, something than which a greater cannot be thought exists 
both in the understanding and in reality. [...].
CHAPTer THree
[God] cannot be thought not to exist.
Assuredly, this [being] exists so truly [i.e. really] that it cannot even be thought 
not to exist. For there can be thought to exist something which cannot be 
thought not to exist; and this thing is greater than that which can be thought 
not to exist. Therefore, if that than which a greater cannot be thought could be 
thought not to exist, then that than which a greater cannot be thought would 
not be that than which a greater cannot be thought – [a consequence] which is 
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contradictory. Hence, something than which a greater cannot be thought exists 
so truly that it cannot even be thought not to exist. And You are this [being] [...]. 
Therefore, [...] You exist so truly that You cannot even be thought not to exist. 
And this is rightly the case. For if any mind could think of something better 
than You, the creature would rise above the Creator and would sit in judgment 
over the Creator – something which is utterly absurd. Indeed, except for You 
alone, whatever else exists can be thought not to exist. Therefore, You alone exist 
most truly of all and thus most greatly of all; for whatever else exists does not 
exist as truly [as do You] and thus exists less greatly [than do You]. since, then, 
it is so readily clear to a rational mind that You exist most greatly of all, why did 
the Fool say in his heart that God does not exist?! – why [indeed] except because 
[he is] foolish and a fool!
CHAPTer Four
How the Fool said in his heart that which cannot be thought.
Yet, since to speak in one’s heart and to think are the same thing, how did [the 
Fool] say in his heart that which he was unable to think, or how was he unable 
to think that which he did say in his heart? Now, if he truly [i.e. really] – rather, 
since he truly – both thought [what he did] because he said [it] in his heart and 
did not say [it] in his heart because he was unable to think [it], then it is not 
the case that something is said in the heart, or is thought, in only one way. For 
in one way a  thing is thought when the word signifying it is thought, and in 
another way [it is thought] when that which the thing is is understood. Thus, in 
the first way but not at all in the second, God can be thought not to exist. Indeed, 
no one who understands that which God is can think that God does not exist, 
even though he says these words [viz. “God does not exist”] in his heart either 
without any signification or with some strange signification. For God is that 
than which a greater cannot be thought. Anyone who rightly understands this, 
surely understands that that [than which a  greater cannot be thought] exists 
in such way that it cannot even conceivably not exist. Therefore, anyone who 
understands that God is such [a being] cannot think that He does not exist. [...].
omitting rhetorical accents, Anselm’s argument can be segmented into 
several steps:
(1) It is possible to imagine a being than which none greater can be 
conceived.
(2) existence in reality is greater than existence in the mind alone.
(3) If any imagined being exists only in the human mind, it is not 
a “being than which none greater can be conceived”.
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(4) Any being than which none greater can be conceived must also 
exist in reality.
(5) The lack of existence in reality would mean the failure to be 
a being than which none greater can be conceived.
(6) Consequently, the being than which none greater can be conceived 
must exist, and we truly call this being God.
In fact, Anselm argues that if one can imagine God as the being which 
is greater than any other being, the predicate “is God” is not empty. 
Anselm’s demonstration goes via reductio ad absurdum and tries to 
establish God’s existence on the basis of the assertion “it is impossible to 
conceive the predicate ‘is God’ as empty”.
Gaunilo agrees that we can imagine something which is greater than 
any other being and debate about such items, in particular about their 
existence. similarly, we can imagine items which have no counterparts 
in the actual world. surely, we understand related locutions. However, 
according to Gaunilo, these observations do not lead to any definite 
existential conclusions. Gaunilo applies this observation to the being 
which is greater than any other being (here “in the understanding” 
means “in mind”):
but that this being must exist, not only in the understanding but also in reality, 
is thus proved to me:
If it did not so exist, whatever exists in reality would be greater than it. And so 
the being which has been already proved to exist in my understanding, will not 
be greater than all other beings.
I still answer: if it should be said that a being which cannot be even conceived 
in terms of any fact, is in the understanding, I do not deny that this being is, 
accordingly, in my understanding. but since through this fact it can be no wide 
attain to real existence also, I do not concede to it that existence at all, until some 
certain proof of it shall be given.
For he who says that this being exists, because otherwise the being which is 
greater than all will not be greater than all, does not attend strictly enough to 
what he is saying. For I do not yet say, no, I even deny or doubt that this being 
is greater than any real object. Nor do I concede to it any other existence (if it 
should be called existence) which it has when the mind, according to a word 
merely heard, tries to form an image of an object absolutely unknown to me. [...].
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[I]t should be proved first that this being itself really exists somewhere; and 
then, from the fact that it is greater than all, we shall not hesitate to infer that it 
also subsists in itself.
[...] For example: it is said that somewhere in the ocean is an  island, which, 
because of the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of discovering what does not 
exist, is called the lost Island. And they say that this island has an inestimable 
wealth of all manner of riches and delicacies in greater abundance than is told 
of the islands of the blest; and that having no owner or inhabitant, it is more 
excellent than all other countries, which are inhabited by mankind, in the 
abundance with which it is stored.
Now if someone should tell me that there is such an  island, I  should easily 
understand his words, in which there is no difficulty. but suppose that we went 
on to say, as if by a logical inference: “You can no longer doubt that this island 
which is more excellent than all lands exists somewhere, since you have no 
doubt that it is in your understanding. And since it is more excellent not to be in 
the understanding alone, but to exist both in the understanding and in reality, 
for this reason it must exist. For if it does not exist, any land which really exists 
will be more excellent than it; and so the island already understood by you to be 
more excellent will not be more excellent.
If a man should try to prove to me by such reasoning that that this island truly 
exists, and that its existence should be no longer be doubted, either I  should 
believe that he was jesting, or I know not which I ought to regard as the greater 
fool; myself, supposing that I  should allow this proof; or him, if he should 
suppose that that he had established with any certainty that existence of this 
island. For he ought to show first that the hypothetical excellence of this island 
exists as a real and indubitable fact, and in no wise as any unreal object, or one 
whose existence is uncertain, in my understanding.
Thus, Gaunilo argues that conceiving something as greater than 
anything else does not imply that the imagined objects exists. In fact, 
Gaunilo rejects two conclusions. Firstly, that the item in question 
must exist (a stronger assertion), and secondly, that it exists (a weaker 
assertion). Generally, according to Gaunilo, being in the understanding 
(mind) does not entail an assertion of existence. Yet he did not intend 
to prove that God does not exist, but only to demonstrate that Anselm’s 
argument is not valid.
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st. Anselm counterattacked Gaunilo’s objections immediately and 
tried to show that his criticism fails. He repeated his demonstration in 
the following way:
[...] if that [i.e. that which is greater than any other] being can be even conceived 
to be, it must exist in reality. For that than which a greater is inconceivable cannot 
be conceived except as without beginning. but whatever can be conceived to 
exist, and does not exist, can be conceived to exist through a beginning. Hence 
what can be conceived to exist, but does not exist, is not the being than which 
is a greater cannot be conceived. Therefore, if such a being can be conceived to 
exist, necessarily it does exist.
As far as the matter concerns the island which is the most excellent but 
still unreal (the lost Island), Anselm points out that it can be conceived 
as not existing. The lost Island is essentially different from God, because 
one cannot imagine the object greater than He is, although the most 
excellent land could be still replaced by a more excellent land. Anselm’s 
argumentation, in his reply to Gaunilo, explicitly refers to modalities, 
because it essentially uses the idea that God’s existence is necessary, but 
the lost Island and similar items are contingent.
It seems that Gaunilo’s criticism of Anselm remained unknown until 
recent times. Thomas Aquinas, who rejected Anselm’s ontological proof 
in favour of cosmological demonstrations, never mentioned the monk of 
marmoutier, although the Doctor Angelicus shared Gaunino’s contention 
that merely conceptual analysis of the essence has no existential 
consequences. According to Aquinas’ view, one must prove God’s 
existence before accepting that essentia implies existentiae in the case of 
supreme being. The Anselm/Gaunilo controversy was also ignored by 
further ontological attempts to prove God’s existence, in particular by 
Descartes and leibniz. Kant criticized such proofs by pointing out that 
existence is not a predicate (is not expressible by a predication), contrary 
to the tradition from Anselm to leibniz. Kant, contrary to Aquinas, 
Descartes, or leibniz, argued that no theoretical, ontological as well as 
cosmological, proof of God’s existence is available. According to Kant, 
who was not an atheist, the issue can be solved by practical reason.
Gaunilo’s name became fairly popular in the age of modal proofs of 
God’s existence.3 I will examine Gaunilo’s arguments, or rather formulate 
3 see J. H. sobel, Logic and Theism: Arguments for and against Beliefs in God 
(Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2004) for an extensive and penetrating survey.
107WAs GAuNIlo rIGHT IN HIs CrITICIsm oF ANselm
Gaunilo-like arguments, in a more contemporary setting. before doing 
so, I will repeat his reasons as well as Anselm’s reply in another language. 
Gaunilo proposed to introduce a  predicate P  defined by the phrase 
“consistently possesses properties F to the greatest degree than other 
objects”, for example the lost Island, mountains higher than all known 
peaks, or persons taller than all people who already exist or will exist in 
the future. Gaunilo’s next step consists in demonstrating that Anselm’s 
inference sometimes leads to true conclusions, but some arguments 
end with false propositions. If so, we have a  simple way to argue that 
there are items which do not exist. This means that Anselm’s proof is 
not conclusive, that is, its conclusion does not follow from the assumed 
premises. once again, this criticism does not lead to the assertion that 
God does not exist, but qualifies Anselm’s proof as formally fallacious. 
Gaunilo claimed that Anselm showed that the denotation of P exists in 
the mind only. Hence, it must be supplemented by demonstration that 
it exists in the world as well. Anselm’s strategy points out that in some 
cases, for example, with respect to the lost Island, we can say either that 
P is empty or that it is non-void. on the other hand, the denotation of the 
predicate “is God” is necessarily non-empty.
Anselm’s understanding of necessity is not quite clear. It stems 
from an  uncritical use of such words as “think”, “conceive”, “imagine”, 
etc. one interpretation is logical and consists in recognising that the 
sentence “the predicate ‘is God’ is non-empty” is necessarily true. The 
second reading is more psychological and suggests that it is impossible 
to conceive that “is God” is empty. This leads to the conclusion of 
conceiving that the predicate “is God” is non-empty, which is a necessary 
conclusion. However, passing from the necessity of conceiving (thinking, 
understanding, imagining, etc.) that some a exists to the necessity of its 
existence can be considered problematic. Accepting this link means that 
the conceivability (possibility of conceiving) of something is equivalent 
to its existential possibility and provokes at least two objections; namely, 
firstly, that of psychologism and, secondly, that human acts of conceiving 
differ with respect to subjective circumstances and cannot measure 
what is objective, possible or necessary. Consequently, one, Anselm for 
instance, can point out that any person arguing for the emptiness of the 
predicate “is God” plays the role of the Fool.
Fortunately, both interpretations can be reconciled by the reduction 
of conceivability to consistency. This move equates possibility and 
consistency, and renders psychological language as a rhetorical ornament 
108 JAN WoleŃsKI
to a  concrete argumentation, for example, concerning the lost Island. 
Contemporary formalizations of Anselm’s proof tend to be completely free 
of such psychologism. one of such formalizations is as follows (I employ 
proposals made by the late Jerzy Perzanowski; his paper is unpublished 
and preserved as a draft). Perzanowski starts with a reconstruction of the 
reasoning proposed by Charles Hartshorne. It is based on two axioms:
(a) If a being is the most perfect, its existence is necessary;
(b) the existence of the most perfect being is possible (leibniz’ lemma).
using modal system S5, we can obtain:
(c) The most perfect being exists.
Perzanowski simplified Hartshorne’s argument by proving (b) in 
a stronger modal logic, equating truth and necessary truth. moreover, 
this logic proves (this is another version of the leibniz lemma)
(d) if the most perfect being is possible (its existence is possible), it is 
necessary (its existence is necessary).
Hence, via modus ponens, we have
(e) the most perfect being exists as necessary (necessary existence 
implies existence).
The last step ends Perzanowski’s reconstruction.
What could contemporary Gaunilo say for Perzanowski’s argument? 
Certainly, he cannot limit himself to arguments advanced by his mediaeval 
predecessor, because Anselm’s followers elaborated new weapons. 
However, the situation of modern Gaunilo is not hopeless. If the matter 
concerns (a), one might observe that it is a conditional assertion having 
an existential antecedent. Hence, any further application of this axiom 
essentially depends on truth of the sentence “the most perfect being 
exists”. If (b) is applied in proving that the most perfect being exists, the 
entire argument is burdened by petitio principii. This is quite evident if 
we consider the equivalence (f); the most perfect being exists if and only 
if the most perfect being exists and it is possible.
However, (f) is trivial because the sentence “a exists” entails “it is possible 
that a exists”. As far as the issue concerns Perzanowski’s simplification, the 
success of his main move based on (d) requires a very strong modal logic 
(the logic of strong rationalism). Although the scope of the term “logic” is 
conventional to some extent, one can express some serious doubts about 
whether logic should lead to existential consequences that are so strong. 
Personally, I would prefer to say that the proof of the leibniz lemma and 
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further steps of the entire argument proceed in the context of some formal 
theory involving modal concepts and relations between them, and that this 
theory is not purely logical. Nevertheless, the fact that Anselm’s argument can 
be presented via a precise formal machinery shows the power of formalization 
applied to concepts of rational theology or theological ontology.
since, according to leibniz, possibility is logically equivalent to 
consistency, (d) can be rendered as
(g) if the most perfect being is consistent, its existence is necessary.
let the letter B denote the predicate “is the most perfect being”. Assume 
that B is introduced by some consistent set K of sentences. by the 
Gödel-malcev completeness theorem (a set X of sentences has a model 
if and only if this set is consistent), K has a  model. This assumption 
metamathematically guarantees that K is non-empty. one can be even 
tempted to say
(h) if a set of sentences has a model, it possesses it necessarily (it is 
impossible that the set in question has no model).
However, this last assertion requires additional constraints (see 
below). The way in which K is given as defining the item conceived as 
greater than any other being, is very important. First of all, the phrase 
“the conceived item” means “the item described by a set of sentences”. 
secondly, according to the common opinion, the most perfect being 
(MPB, for brevity) is introduced by the maximalization procedure. 
metalogically speaking, it consists in the identification of MPB with 
a  collection of perfections (omniscience, omnipotence, the greatest 
goodness, immutability, infinity, etc.); existence belongs to perfections. 
Assume that K0 is a initial consistent collection of perfection. It might 
be maintained that application of the lindenbaum maximalization 
theorem (every consistent set of sentences has a maximally consistent 
extension) provides an  argument for generating the adequate set K. 
However, the lindenbaum extensions are not unique. more specifically, 
if X is a consistent set of sentences, it has more than one (in fact, there 
are infinitely many) maximally consistent extensions. every such 
extensions E has a model (a possible world) in which elements of E are 
true. moreover, since these sentences cannot be false in this model, they 
must be true in it as well. Note that the relativisation to a specific model 
is crucial.
let us apply these observations to the set K0 and K. Clearly, the former 
set has several different maximally consistent extensions, including K, 
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as their part; in fact, K itself is not maximal, but this is a  minor 
point. metamathemathical observations about K are not sufficient to 
demonstrate that this set is true in every possible world. Note that we 
could consider K as a  body of absolute necessities (necessary truths), 
that is, sentences true in every model. It is obvious now that necessity 
of truth with respect to a specific model is not absolute, but just relative, 
because a  sentence true in one model can be false in other possible 
worlds. moreover, there is no a priori reason to refer to one and only one 
initial set K0 of perfections. one could ask, for instance, why the greatest 
goodness or immutability, but not changeability or goodness directed to 
people deserving it to some degree, should be regarded as prima facie 
perfections. Typically listed perfections are recommended by Christian 
(or other similar) theology, but it is only a  religious argument, not 
a logical one. Thus, contemporary versions of Anselm’s ontological proof 
do not show that B is not empty in virtue of logical necessity. Further, 
one cannot demonstrate independently of the assumptions of a  given 
monotheistic theology that the denotation of B is unique.
If we apply a  similar technique to any consistent collection of 
anti-perfections (that is, pointing out the lack of perfections in the 
ordinary or theological sense), it is easily provable by the dual logic and 
metamathematics (it takes falsity as the distinguished value) that there 
is a being such that nothing lesser can be conceived. We can interpret 
this being as the Absolute evil (AE, for brevity). If we entirely omit the 
ordinary or religious meaning of perfection, AB is a  maximal being, 
because it is constructed by a similar maximalization strategy as employed 
in the case of the denotation of B. There is no reason, at least no logical 
reason, to maintain that AE is less real than MPB or the Christian God. 
This leads to a manichean theology with its perennial battle between the 
forces of Goodness and evil, or even a radicalized marcionic heresy on 
which the world presents itself as an emanation of the personified evil, 
in particular, deceiving people in order to make them suffer more. The 
theist could presumably answer that the metamathematically phrased 
ontological proof is enough for demonstrating the existence of MPB, 
let’s say a god of philosophers having properties not entirely coherent 
with Christian theology. This being is necessary and thereby existing. 
However, this standpoint is not correct, even if we agree that some 
perfections actually occur in our world. lindenbaum’s maximalization 
procedure does not imply that there exist maximal perfections in the 
sense of Anselm and his followers. Although people know something, 
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can do something, or behave properly, these facts do not entail that there 
is a being (subject) which realizes these properties in the most maximal 
manner. Thus, there are models in which there occurs no MPB. In fact, 
some maximally consistent extensions of K0 contain the sentence “there 
exists the MPB, according to a given specification of perfections”, but this 
sentence is false in other extensions. since we do not know which model 
represents our universe, we can only say that the gods of philosophers 
(and theologians as well) exist in some possible models.
The contemporary setting of the Gaunilo/Anselm exchange could be 
rendered in such a way:
Anselm. I proved that there is a model in which the predicate B is not empty.
Gaunilo. That’s right, but your strategy allows me to prove that 
an arbitrary consistent predicate is not empty as well.
Anselm. You overlooked that the set of sentences determining the 
denotation of B is necessary (consist of necessary truths). This means 
that this denotation exists (is a  perfection), but references of your 
predicates exist accidentally. Consequently, you cannot deny the 
existence of the denotation of B without contradicting yourself.
Gaunilo. You are mistaken, because you do not distinguish absolute 
and relative necessity. Although you correctly demonstrated that 
the set K used for the characterization of the predicate B is true in 
some model M, the existence of an item satisfying the conditions in 
question is a  perfection, but only with respect to M. There are no 
obstacles to treat my predicates, for instance, related to the lost 
Island, in the same way. moreover, I can prove that there are many 
maximally, but mutually different, perfect beings.
Gaunilo was a faithful Christian and had no doubts concerning God’s 
existence. However, although he could consider atheists as unreasonable 
people, he said something important on behalf of the Fool, namely that 
Anselm did not prove what he intended to demonstrate by his ontological 
argument. According to earlier comments, Gaunilo’s arguments can be 
sharpened by observing that the assertion that God does not exist can 
be consistently added to any set of statements about the empirically 
accessible world; clearly, the sentence “God exists” transcends such sets. 
Thus, Anselm was unfair, when he qualified unbelievers as foolish.
